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HOWARD LAW JOURNAL
The Appropriateness of Deadly Force
A great debate is simmering as to the propriety of a police officer's
shooting a suspect while in the process of bringing him under arrest.
There are some outraged citizens who feel that deadly force should not
be used under any circumstances to perfect an arrest, and there are others
who feel that recourse to such force should be had only as a last resort.
The federal and state law are inconclusive as to when deadly force
is proper to subdue a suspect. Many of the courts, state and federal, rely
upon the reasonable man test to determine whether and when a killing by
a police officer is justified. The implementation of this test is bottomed
on the judicial feeling that the security of persons and property would be
jeopardized, unless felons were brought immediately under arrest and
punished.
And yet there are many citizens, who are less trained in the law, that
are not persuaded by this judicial feeling. They feel that human life, in
some way, takes precedence over property, that police officers should
exercise an unusual amount of restraint when a human life hangs in the
balance. In the last analysis they ask: "When is a policeman required
to kill a suspect?"
This article attempts to answer this question in the context of suspected
felonies and felons. It will explore the law relating to formal arrests and
detentions for investigation' in an effort to determine how much force a
policeman is entitled to use.
ARRESTS
There is considerable law to the effect that an officer who is justified
in making an arrest may use whatever force reasonably necessary to appre-
hend a suspect. 2 If the suspect resists, the officer is entitled to use such
force as may be required, even to the extent of taking a life.3 He can
not, however, use force calculated to produce death or serious bodily in-
jury when the felon offers no resistance, nor can he use any force or vio-
lence disproportionate to the degree of resistance meted out by the sus-
pect.4 A homicide committed in attempting to arrest or prevent the es-
cape of a felon is generally justifiable where the arrest cannot be made or
the escape otherwise prevented. 5
I United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1961).
2 Colorado v. Hutchinson, 9 F.2d 25, 26 (8th Cir. 1925); Vaccaro v. Col-
lier, 38 F.2d 863, 868 (D. Md. 1930). See also 9 Proceedings of The American Law
Institute 179 et seq. (1939), in which the members considered a model statute
that would authorize killings to effect an arrest in special felony cases only.
3 Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 863 (D. Md. 1930).
4 Alexander, Law of Arrest, §§ 95, 583 (1949).
5 Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375 (1927).
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Most killings take place after the fact. Where an arrest without a
warrant is made to justify a homicide in a felony situation, the suspect has
either committed his crime in the view or presence of the officer making
the arrest0 or the officer has had reasonable cause to believe, and did in
good faith believe, that the deceased committed a crime and was trying
to escape. 7 A mere suspicion of that fact is not enough.8  If an officer,
under the latter circumstances, mistakenly applies excessive force-to the
extent of shooting at a fleeing suspect's automobile9 or at the suspect him-
self to enforce an order to stop, 10 and injures or kills him-the officer is
criminally liable."'
At common law, however, a peace officer was at liberty to kill and
was reasonably assured that the killing would be regarded as justifiable
if the escaping suspect could not be subdued in any other way. 1 2  There
was a feeling in the law that when an officer with the power of arrest or
the right to investigate a crime acted in the execution of his duty, the law
placed a peculiar protection around him"a that legitimatized his use of
force. Modern courts, consistent with this notion, are saying to jurors
that they must judge the necessity of a police officer's use of deadly force
in the light of the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the officer
at the time. 14 Jurors must vicariously relive the police officer's experience
6 Stinnett v. Virginia, 55 F.2d 644, 646 (4th Cir. 1932).
7 See e.g., Lacy v. State, 7 Tex. App. 403, 413 (1879).
8 Poldo v. United States, 55 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1932). Mere suspicion is
not enough. There must be circumstances apparent to the officer, through the
testimony of his senses, sufficient to justify a good faith belief that a suspect has
violated the law. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-595 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-15 (1948); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958). See Hogan,
"The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue," 47 Geo. L.I. 1, 12
(1958); Fraenkel, "From Suspicion to Accusation," 51 Yale L.J. 748, 754-55 (1942);
Douglas, "Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion," 70 Yale L.J. 1, 12, 13 (1960).
9 Castle v. Lewis, 254, F. 917, 925-926 (8th Cir. 1918); United States v.
Kaplan, 286 F. 963, 974 (S.D. Ga. 1923); Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 354, 170
P. 869, 873 (1918). All of these cases say that a policeman may not act in wanton
disregard for the lives of the innocent, be they suspect or not. See citation of
cases in 18 A.L.R., Peace Officer, 1368.
10 People v. McCarthy, 110 N.Y. 309, 18 N.E. 128 (1888); Petrie v. Cartwright,
114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902); Abell v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. App. 380, 5
S.W.2d 139 (1928); Taylor v. State, 157 Tenn. 421, 7 S.W.2d 50 (1928).
11 Alexander, supra note 4 at 1601-02. 1 Wharton, Crim. Law, § 529 (Kerr
l1th Ed. 1912).
12 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, § 647 (8th Ed. 1892); 1 Russell, Law of Crimes,
666 (3rd Eng Ed. 1843). See People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799 (1894).
It is an illustration of the type of conduct the court does not consider excessive.
13 Arwood v. United States, 134 F.2d 1007, 1013 (6th Cir. 1943) (dissenting
opinion).
14 Bell v. United States, 102 U.S. App. D.C. 383, 386, 254 F.2d 82, 85 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Colorado v. Hutchinson, 9 F.2d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1925).
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in order to decide what a reasonable and prudent officer would do under
the same or similar circumstances.' 5
It is significant to note that most maimings and deaths occur at the
point where an officer attempts to restrain a suspect's actions. Often
times the restraint is based on a mistaken suspicion."' The question
necessarily arises, in what situations is a policeman authorized to detain
a person in connection with a suspected crime, and to enforce his deten-
tion by the use of deadly force. There is authority for the proposition
that a policeman has considerable control over motorists but very little
over pedestrians. 17 The former rule is based on the judicial notion that a
person who obtains a state driver's license waives any right to object to
reasonable police action involving him as a motorist.18  So, should a
motorist be stopped for a routine investigation, his "being stopped" does
not constitute an arrest. 19 There is no taking into custody and no purpose
other than to check the driver's license or to investigate him or his car.20
It follows that in those instances in which a policeman cannot lawfully
arrest a motorist, he cannot resort to force to detain him.21
The law as to the amount of control a policeman has over a pedestrian
is laden with uncertainties. Some judicial authorities say that a peace
officer may detain a pedestrian, when suspicious circumstances give rise
to a plausible inference that a crime has been committed. 22  Others say
15 There is some discrepancy among authorities as to the appropriate reason-
able man standard to be applied to judge a policeman's conduct. Stacy v. Emery,
97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878); Castle v. Lewis, 254 F. 917, 925 says that the standard
should be the "ordinary and prudent" man. Bell v. United States, 102 U.S. App.
D.C. 383, 254 F.2d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1958), says that the standard is the "reason-
able and prudent" police officer. Ellis v. United States, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 86, 88,
264 F.2d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
16 People v. McCarthy, 110 N.Y. 309, 18 N.E. 128 (1888); Petrie v. Cartwright,
114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902); Abell v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. App. 380, 5
S.W.2d 139 (1928); Taylor v. State, 157 Tenn. 421, 7 S.W.2d 50 (1928).
17 White v. United States, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 246, 271 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir.
1959); People v. Tinston, 6 Misc. 2d 485, 490, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554, 560-561 (Magis.
Ct. 1957); Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 167 A. 241, 242 (1933).
Inbau, Cases in Criminal Justice, 513-514 (1964); Donegan and Fisher, Know the
Law, 222-238 (1958).
18 Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784, 787 (Fla. 1959); Thornhill v. Kirkman,
62 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. 1953). Inbau, supra, note 16 at 513. As regards the
"Motorist Waiver Principle" generally, see Weinstein, "Statutes Compelling Sub-
mission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication," 45 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 541 (1955).
19 Inbau, supra, note 16 at 513. See also Donegan and Fisher, supra, note 16.
20 Id.
21 Inbau, op. cit.
22 If the act under scrutiny is a detention, reasonable suspicion is a satisfactory
basis upon which to hold a person. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d
32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964); People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 243, 219 N.E.2d
595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 222 (1966). If, however, the act under scrutiny is an
arrest, probable cause is required. Wisniewski v. United States, 47 F.2d 825, 826
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that there needs to be evidence, apparent to the officer's senses, that a
particular pedestrian committed or was attempting to commit a crime.
23
Under the second rule, any "evidence" apparent to the officer's sense
would warrant his perfecting an arrest and resorting to any force necessary
to subdue the suspect. The same result, however, does not necessarily
obtain under the former rule. As long as there has been no attempted or
actual arrest, no force should be resorted to by a police officer to restrain
a pedestrian he has stopped.
The human value jeopardized by questionable police practice is the
right of every citizen-motorist and pedestrian-to be secure in his person
against unreasonable arrest. Our early history discloses that there have
been many movements afoot in rebellion against the practice of arresting
citizens on the basis of suspicions.24  Early American and colonial de-
cisions show that common rumors and reports, suspicions and even
strong reasons to suspect were not regarded as adequate to support
arrests.25 To this day, that principle has survived; suspicion, no matter
how strong, can never confer upon the police officer a power which
would otherwise be lacking.26 In effect, an arrest by a police officer
(6th Cir. 1931). As a rule the judicial inquiry is focused upon those facts attend-
ing the act thought to be unlawful. When a policeman takes the law into his own
hands, he must act on some evidence known to him. See Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949);
United States v. Murray, 51 F.2d 516, 518-519 (D. Md. 1931).
23 Green v. District of Columbia, 91 A.2d 712, 714-715 (Mun. Ct. App. 1952);
Lawson v. United States, 9 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 1925); McKnight v. United
States, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 151, 152, 183 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United
States v. Lassoff, 147 F. Supp. 944, 953 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Brown v. United States, 4
F.2d 246, 247 (9th Cir. 1925); Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557, 562,
565 (6th Cir. 1948). These cases say that the validity of an arrest, without a
warrant, must be determined by evidence known before and not after the arrest.
Suspicion, hearsay and opinion are never sufficient to render an arrest valid. Some-
times, however, the federal basis for a lawful arrest is inapplicable. United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 n. 5
(1948). In the absence of an applicable federal statute, the law of the place where
the arrest without a warrant takes place determines its validity. "There is no rea-
son to believe that the state law is not an equally appropriate standard by which
to test an arrest without a warrant, except in those cases where Congress has en-
acted a federal rule." United States v. Di Re, supra at 590.
24 The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was
left blank was declared illegal by the House of Commons in 1766. 16 Hansard,
Parl. Hist. Eng., 207 (1813). There were rebellions afoot against the writs of as-
sistance which James Otis inveighed. Quincy's Mass. Rep. 1761-1772, Appendix
467. See also Lasson, "The History and Development of the United States Consti-
tution," Series 55, No. 2. John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Po-
litical Science, 35, 95, 117 and 132 (1937) and the authorities cited therein.
25 Frisbie v. Butler, Kerby's Rep. 213 (Conn. 1787); Conner v. Common-
wealth, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa. 1810); Grummon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 39 (1814); Com-
monwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841).
26 Henry v. United States. 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959).
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can never be justified by suspicion alone or by what a subsequent search
discloses. 27  What then may a police officer do to law abiding citizens
in the interval between the time when his suspicion is wrongfully aroused
and there is sufficient evidence apparent to his senses to warrant an
arrest? The officer may do very little. Under our system of laws sus-
picion is never enough for an officer to lay a hand on a citizen. In a
felony situation we should not, indeed we may not, permit a policeman's
purely subjective feelings concerning the possibility of danger to himself
to replace "probable cause to believe" as the controlling test as to when
an individual's constitutional right may be invaded. 28 There is abundant
law to the effect that a policeman, in the proper performance of his duty,
is authorized to investigate suspicious activity, that is to say, to temporarily
stop and question individuals so engaged.29  Though suspicion may be
a sufficient basis to stop and question, it furnishes no basis for an arrest30
and certainly none for resorting to force.
DETENTIONS: ARRESTS ON SUSPICION
The basic argument in favor of arrests on suspicion is the need for
the opportunity to interrogate a person whom the police suspect of criminal
activity. The person may be one whom the police suspect but cannot
charge with a crime because probable cause is lacking. He may also
be a person against whom the police do not have enough evidence to
support a charge, but whom they desire to interrogate to check out his
explanation or to secure more substantial evidence of guilt.31  It is ar-
gued, on the other hand, that such arrests manifest grave evils and dan-
gers. A person subject to them is torn from his daily routine and held at
the mercy of those whose job it is to prosecute him. He is deprived of
freedom without a proper judicial tribunal having found him guilty of
27 United States v. Iotchkiss, 60 F. Supp. 405, 407 (D. Md. 1945). See also
note 23 supra.
28 Report and Recommendation of the D.C. Commissioners' Committee on Po-
lice Arrests for Investigation, 33 (1962); Foote, "The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle
or Necessity in the Law of Arrest," 51 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 402 (1960).
29 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964)
and the citations therein; People v. Estrialgo, 19 App. Div. 509, 512, 245 N.Y.S.2d
850, 853 (1964).
30 Where Congress has enacted a federal rule, arrests must be based upon
probable cause. See notes 22 and 23 supra.
31 Report and Recommendations of the Commissioners' Committee on Police Ar-
rests for Investigation 15 (1962). See also, in connection with this argument, Wil-
son, "Police Arrest Privilege in a Free Society; A Plea for Moderation," 51 J. Crim.
L., C.&P.S. 395 (1960). Remington, "The Law Relating to 'On the Street Deten-
tions,'" 51 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 386 (1960).
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any crime or that there is probable cause to believe that he may be
guilty. 82
But the arguments persist. The most recent struggle took place on
the issue of detentions based upon reasonable suspicion.83 The outcome
was a decision that temporary detentions were lawful when the arresting
officer could point to specific facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion.34 It is
a mystery how a seizure under these circumstances can be constitutional.3 5
It gives more power to a police officer than is exercisable by a magistrate
issuing a warrant for a person's arrest.3 6  The question is: By what
standard shall a policeman's conduct be judged? Although worthwhile
reasons are given in support of detentions based on reasonable suspicion,
they are never satisfactory explanations for a homicide. When a police-
man acts with the intent to kill or inflict grave bodily injury there must be
sufficient facts within his personal knowledge to warrant an arrest. Prob-
able cause is the only acceptable standard.
THE PROBLEM
As a general rule, any officer who is about to make an arrest is
told that he may use such force as is necessary to effect the arrest but that
he may use his gun only as a last resort.37 Beyond these instructions he is
provided with little in the way of objective standards. If he is not fleet
of foot, when pursuing one who is evading capture, will he be justified
in shooting sooner than his more agile comrade? Or, if he is five foot
five, does that give him the right to draw quicker, when he is engaged in
an unequal scuffle with a suspect who is six foot four, or, what choices
would he have if the altercation ensued while investigating a suspicious
activity?
To a policeman faced for the first time with the necessity of making
split second decisions, to be judged retrospectively by twelve men, who
have time to methodically weigh the pros and cons, must seem unfair.
32 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1961).
33 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34 Id. at 21. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 34-37 (1963).
35 The courts have said over the years that probable cause determines the
validity of an arrest without a warrant. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
161-162 (1925); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1948); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-484 (1963). See, however, note 23. There
is no federal common law standard for an arrest without a warrant. United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 590 (1948).
36 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36 (1968) (Douglas dissenting). See also Aspen,
"Arrest and Arrest Alternatives," U. Ill. Law R. 241, 251, n. 74 (1966).
37 E.g. Manual of the Metropolitan Police Department, § 29(a)-(c), at 30.
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But this is the nature of our legal system and the method by which an
officer's conduct is to be judged. When a policeman seeks to use force
to effect an arrest, two things must be considered: a) whether the arrest
itself was lawful; and b) whether he has used no more force than was
necessary.38 In New York it is enough that an officer reasonably be-
lieves that a crime has been committed by someone, though not neces-
sarily by the arrestee, to effect a legal arrest.39 This is not to say that
the probable cause standard is not applicable to New York or any of the
other states.40  It is to suggest, however, that something less than prob-
able cause is often used first to legitimatize arrests. This is a growing
practice which is gaining greater and greater legislative sanction.41
If force likely to produce death is ever resorted to, it should be law-
ful only for effecting arrests of a certain type, namely for felonies. At
common law a policeman could kill to overcome any resistance to arrest
by a felon, including flight.42 There was a great deal of logic to this rule,
because at common law all felonies were punishable by death. 43  But now,
where the death sentence has been abolished everywhere for all but a
few felonies, 44 it is an anachronism to say that a man who could be sen-
tenced to a few years in prison for an offence, can justifiably be shot by a
policeman before there is even proof of his guilt.
Sometimes, however, there is no choice but to use force. It depends
entirely upon the nature of the resistance offered. The resistance may
38 Newman, Police, the Law and Personal Freedom, 23 (1964). Under the
fourth amendment, an arrest was lawful only if the arresting officer had "probable
cause" to make the arrest at the time. Williams v. United States, 99 U.S. App. D.C.
161, 237 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Stephens v. United States, 106 U.S. App. D.C.
249, 271 F.2d 832, 833-834 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d
262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961). See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
39 N.Y. Criminal Code and Penal Law, §§ 179, 180(a) (Gilbert Ed. 1968).
40 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963).
41 D.C. Omnibus Crime Act, 81 Stat. 735 (1967); N.Y. Criminal Code and
Penal Laws, § 180(a) (Gilbert Ed. 1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968);
Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
where the Court used the public's interest in the investigation of crime and the need
to protect police officers to establish the legality of a street detention and search.
Id. at 23-24. In effect something less than, or other than, probable cause was used
as the standard of reasonableness by which a subsequent arrest was evaluated.
Note, "Stop & Frisk in California," 18 Hastings L.J. 623 (1968); Warner, "The
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942). But see Foote, The Fourth
Amendment: "Obstacle or Necessity in The Law of Arrest," 51 J. Crim. L.,
C.&P.S. 402 (1960); Schoenfeld, "The Stop & Frisk Law is Unconstitutional," 17
Syc. L. Rev. 627 (1966).
42 Bishop, supra note 12.
43 Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 468 (1895); I Russell, Law of Crimes, 42
(3rd Eng. Ed. 1843).
44 E.g. D.C. Code, Criminal Offenses, §§ 22-401, 22-2201, 22-2401, 22-2801,
and 22-2901; N.Y. Criminal Code and Penal Law, §§ 55.05-.10, 125.20-.30, 130.25-
.35, 140.20-.30, 150.00-.15, and 160.00-.15 (Gilbert 1968).
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be flight or struggle. In the interval between these poles, if the policeman
persists in his attempt to arrest, as he is justified in doing, he may find
his life in danger. At that point he may be justified in using greater
force than heretofore required. But such force should be reasonably
necessary under the circumstances. 45  Did the officer make his official
character known, particularly when he was not in uniform; did he warn
the suspect that he would use force, or fire warning shots, before shooting
to kill; did he make a reasonable effort to capture by pursuing? Was the
situation such that, with some additional effort on the part of the police-
man, the suspect could have been overtaken? Suppose the suspect sur-
rendered, or was helpless from wounds, or the officer was in a position to
call upon other officers nearby, or possibly on bystanders for help, was
it then necessary to shoot? A negative answer to any or all of these
questions vitiates necessity. In weighing a man's life in the balance un-
der the above circumstances the value of his life far exceeds the need to
kill.
The Supreme Court has said that the national standard for arrests is
probable cause. 46  It requires a policeman to have reasonable grounds
to believe that a felony has been committed and that the suspect he
arrested committed it.47 To say, as some legal spokesmen do, that
there are risks in the investigatory activity undertaken by a policeman
preliminary to an arrest is to state the obvious. It is quite another thing,
however, to conclude on this fact that a peace officer should be free to
seize every suspicious looking individual and allowed to resort to force
(deadly force) on that basis. The fourth amendment guarantees the
right of the people to be secure, first of all, in their persons. To what
end is security against crime, if a person's liberty is sacrificed in the
process or tragic deaths follow? The freedom which the Constitution
45 Colorado v. Hutchinson, 9 F.2d 275, 276 (8th Cir. 1925); Vaccaro v. Collier,
38 F.2d 863, 868 (D. Md. 1930). See also 9 Proceedings of The American Law
Institute 179 et seq. (1939), in which the members considered a model statute that
would authorize killings to effect an arrest in special felony cases only.
46 Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963); Poldo v. United States, 55 F.2d
866, 869 (9th Cir. 1932). Mere suspicion is not enough. There must be cir-
cumstances apparent to the officer, through the testimony of his senses, sufficient
to justify a good faith belief that a suspect has violated the law. Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-595
(1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948); Giordenella v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958). See Hogan, "The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its
Rise, Rationale and Rescue," 47 Geo. L.J. 1, 12 (1958); Fraenkel, "From Suspicion
to Accusation," 51 Yale L.J. 748, 754-55 (1942); Douglas, "Vagrancy and Arrest
on Suspicion," 70 Yale L.J. 1, 12, 13 (1960).
47 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 135 (1968) (Douglas dissenting); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
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guarantees is assured to the best of men only if it is vouchsafed to the
worse, however distasteful the latter may be. 48
RONALD C. GRIFFIN
48 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
